Ownership Concentration Affects Dividend Policy of the Brazilian Firm

Vicente Lima Crisóstomo, José Wellington Brandão

Resumo


OBJETIVO
O objetivo do trabalho é analisar, sob o enfoque da Teoria da Agência, se a concentração de propriedade tem efeito na política de dividendos da empresa brasileira. Especificamente, analisa-se a possibilidade de haver expropriação de acionistas minoritários através da redução da distribuição de dividendos como previsto pela hipótese expropriação.

METODOLOGIA
Para um painel de dados não balanceado, composto por 2,274 observações anuais de 254 empresas cotadas na BM&FBovespa, no período 1996-2012, modelos de política de dividendos foram estimados pelo método generalizado de momentos (GMM).

RESULTADOS E CONCLUSÕES
Os resultados indicam que a concentração de propriedade, aproximada pela presença de um acionista majoritário, de fato, tem efeito negativo sobre na distribuição de dividendos. Este resultado esta de acordo com hipótese expropriação de acionistas minoritários por parte de acionistas controladores que podem dispor de outras formas de obtenção de retorno para seu investimento.

IMPLICAÇÕES PRÁTICAS
O trabalho apresenta uma contribuição adicional para a compreensão da política de dividendos da empresa brasileira ao prover evidência no contexto do enfoque de conflitos agência. Efetivamente, a concentração de propriedade parece ter um papel relevante na determinação da política de dividendos no Brasil, sendo este papel prejudicial para acionistas minoritários.

PALAVRAS-CHAVE
Dividend Policy, Ownership Structure, Expropriation Hypothesis, Brazil.


OWNERSHIP CONCENTRATION AFFECTS DIVIDEND POLICY OF THE BRAZILIAN FIRM

OBJECTIVE
The paper aims to analyze, under the Agency Theory framework, whether ownership concentration has effects on dividend policy of the Brazilian company. Specifically, the work analyzes the possibility of expropriation of minority shareholders by reducing the dividend distribution as predicted by the expropriation hypothesis.

METHODOLOGY
For an unbalanced data panel, composed of 2,274 firm-year observations of 254 companies listed on the BM&FBovespa, in the period 1996-2012, dividend models were estimated by the generalized method of moments (GMM).

RESULTS AND CONCLUSIONS
The results indicate that ownership concentration, proxied by the presence of a major shareholder, in fact, has a negative effect on the dividend distribution. This result is in agreement with the expropriation hypothesis of minority shareholders by controlling shareholders who may have other ways of obtaining return for their investment.

PRACTICAL IMPLICATIONS
The work presents an additional contribution to the understanding of the Brazilian company's dividend policy by providing evidence in the context of the agency conflicts. Indeed, the ownership concentration seems to have an important role in determining the dividend policy in Brazil, which is harmful for minority shareholders.

KEYWORDS
Dividend Policy; Ownership Structure; Expropriation Hypothesis; Brazil.

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